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September 11, 2001, is a date that resonates in each American; not only lives but policies 
and security practices changed that day. The intelligence community expanded its scope 
to include first responders, private citizens, and private companies. However, the U.S. jail 
system remains almost entirely overlooked by the homeland security intelligence 
community. The jail system provides a unique opportunity to gather real-time actionable 
intelligence without the need of a warrant. Some of the most villainous and notorious 
terrorists have spent time in jail and might have been caught or thwarted by a well-trained 
jail information team intimately connected to the national intelligence community. The 
intelligence community has yet to take advantage of the wealth of homeland security 
information concentrated, and accessible, in the U.S. jail system.  
Using qualitative research methods and Yin’s case study analysis, the Intelligence 
Cycle, and Lowenthal’s IC Functional Flow model in its analytical approach, this thesis 
explores three homeland security intelligence-gathering models to determine how best 
practices can be used to create a homeland security jail intelligence best practice model. 
The U.S. intelligence community will benefit from, and must act upon, the insights that 
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In order to achieve results we need a law enforcement environment that 
views intelligence as a precondition to effective policing, rather than as a 
supplement. 
Robert Kopal 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
September 11, 2001, was a day that fundamentally changed the United States and, 
more specifically, the intelligence community. In the 9/11 Commission Report, the 
Commission listed 11 agencies that were responsible for intelligence gathering prior to 
9/11.1 During the commission’s investigation, it determined that the intelligence 
community was too restrictive with information sharing and that it had failed to “connect 
the dots.” One of the commission’s recommendations was to expand the intelligence 
community by using unconventional entities and combining joint intelligence with joint 
action (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 407). Some of the unconventional entities include the 
private sector’s information contribution to the intelligence community. Over 10 years 
after 9/11, and nearly seven years after the recommendations put forth by the 9/11 
Commission, it is important to ask whether those recommendations were implemented.  
The FBI is the lead domestic agency in charge of investigating terrorism and protecting 
the homeland against terrorism. Prior to 9/11, the FBI’s primary focus was law 
enforcement; its domestic security mission was secondary. Robert S. Mueller, director of 
the FBI at the time of 9/11, was quoted during a statement to the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (2001), as saying, “Prior to the 9/11 
attacks, the FBI’s operations were heavily weighted towards its law enforcement 
mission” (Mueller, 2011). Today, 10 years after 9/11, the FBI’s new mission “is to 
protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to 
                                                 
1 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 
Military Intelligence entities, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Office of Terrorism and Finance 
Intelligence of the Department of Treasury, Office of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and 
Counterintelligence Divisions of the FBI and DOJ, Office of Intelligence of the Department of Energy 




uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and 
criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, tribal, and international agencies and 
partners” (Mueller, 2011). The FBI now relies on local law enforcement as an essential 
part of the intelligence community, and this is one example of the profound changes in 
American intelligence gathering since 9/11.  
The 9/11 Commission report recommended that local law enforcement take a 
more active role in domestic security intelligence. “A ‘smart’ government would 
integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source 
analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence” (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. 401). Local law enforcement officers are crucial to the intelligence 
community for a number of reasons. First, local law enforcement officers spend their 
entire career in a specific jurisdiction and thus become experts concerning the area they 
police. They know about the community they serve and often have a number of 
informants in the community who provide them with criminal information. Local law 
enforcement officers are often known by community members, and after a period of time, 
officers develop a rapport with people in the community. In contrast, FBI agents do not 
wear uniforms, do not respond to calls from citizens, and do not have the opportunity to 
develop rapport or insider understanding of any particular local community. The 
intelligence community realizes that local law enforcement officers are on the frontlines 
of detecting and preventing homeland security–related crimes and activities (USDHS, 
2012).  
When the strengths of local law enforcement are combined with the strengths of 
federal law enforcement, the resulting synergy achieves more than either kind of law 
enforcement could manage alone. In 1979, New York City experienced a spike in bank 
robberies (Anti-Defamation League, 2011). In response, the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) and the FBI joined the NYPD’s expertise in the community with the 
FBI’s expertise in bank robbery investigations and formed a task force. The success of 
the NYPD/FBI task force eventually led to the creation of the Joint Terrorism Task Force 




Since 9/11, local police agencies have been forming JTTFs and taking a larger 
role in collecting intelligence related to homeland security efforts around the United 
States (Velez-Villar, 2012). Prior to 9/11, local police agencies focused on gathering 
intelligence about gang members and narcotics violators who threatened their specific 
jurisdictions. Now, local law enforcement agencies serve as an integral part of the 
national intelligence community. However, there is one area within law enforcement’s 
jurisdiction that could provide a wealth of homeland security information but that has 
been largely overlooked: the jail system.  
Many local law enforcement agencies around the United States actively 
participate in joint terrorism task forces and their local fusion centers. However, there 
exists a void in intelligence gathering within the jurisdiction of local law enforcement. 
The United States has one of the largest jail systems in the world, but it lacks an 
organized approach or structure to gather homeland security information from the jail 
system to share with the intelligence community.  
The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) listed transnational 
criminal organizations such as drug cartels as a threat to the security of the United States. 
“Criminals, terrorist networks, and other malicious actors will seek to exploit the same 
interconnected systems and networks of the global economy for nefarious purposes, or 
create their own illicit pathways for smuggling and trafficking—of illegal drugs, illegal 
migrants, terrorists, or even highly dangerous weapons” (USDHS, 2010, p. 48). To 
combat transnational criminal organizations, the QHSR recommended that “working 
appropriately with domestic law enforcement partners, the Intelligence Community, and 
foreign partners, we must identify these illicit pathways, understand their nodes and 
conveyances, monitor their use, and effectively intervene to stop dangerous people or 
goods in transit and dismantle the pathways themselves” (USDHS, 2010, p. 51). The jail 
system is a prime environment to collect homeland security information. 
For example, the county of Los Angeles is one of the largest ethnically diverse 
counties in the United States. According to the 2010 census, Los Angeles County has a 
population of nearly 10 million people; of that 10 million, almost 3.5 million are foreign 




diverse and is the largest jail system in the free world. Within the confines of the Los 
Angeles County jail system, there have been cases of inmates who have radicalized and 
later formed terrorist groups among the inmate population. One such group was called 
Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Sheeh (JIS) or the “Authentic Assembly of Islam,” at Folsom State 
Prison, near Sacramento, California. The members of this cell plotted to bomb several 
military bases, synagogues, and an Israeli consulate in California. The indictment 
indicated that several core members of the cell were arrested in Los Angeles County for 
robbery (America at a Crossroads, n.d.). “The effort to impact ‘homegrown’ terrorism in 
prisons, jails and society is a monumental task which requires the cooperation of local, 
state and federal agencies and the community at large” (Mead, 2007). 
There are also members of Los Zetas, a violent Mexican drug cartel, who have 
recruited inmates who have recently been released from the Los Angeles County jail 
system (Pitts Report, 2010). Robert Killbrew from the Foreign Policy Research Institute 
wrote an article entitled The New Threat: Transnational Crime. There, Killbrew stated 
that transnational criminal activity such as criminal drug cartels is a major threat affecting 
the security of the United States. 
Criminal cartels, gangs and other illegal armed groups are today spending 
billions of dollars annually to undermine governments worldwide, either 
by corruption or, when that fails, by intimidation and violence. From the 
US perspective, the impact of these developments is generally recognized 
in the growing violence along the U.S.’ southern border, where the 
Mexican drug cartels fight their own government and one another for 
access to the lucrative drug markets inside the US. Defeating the rise of 
transnational crime—turning back the growth of the cartels and other 
criminal networks—will call for the US to integrate its efforts with allied 
countries to a much higher degree than previously, and to develop much 
smoother working relationships among law enforcement and 
governmental agencies within the United States itself. 
(Killbrew, 2011, p. 2) 
The U.S. jail system is a fertile ground of information and is ready to be 
cultivated. Jails around the United States have information concerning transnational 
criminal activity and terrorism-related crimes that can be gathered and turned into 




meet the needs of local, state, and federal agencies. This intelligence model must be cost 
effective, able to share information with the intelligence community, able to analyze 
information gathered from the jail system, and represent a model made up of personnel 
with the necessary training to spot and access potential homeland security information. 
There already exist a number of models in the United States that successfully collect 
information; three existing models will be analyzed for best practices, from which we can 
distill a homeland security jail information model. Despite all the years following 9/11, 
while the terrorist cell, Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam is-Sheen (JIS) formed in California’s Folsom 
State Prison in 2005, while some of the world’s most notorious terrorists have been in a 
jail facility, while criminal cartels perforate and permeate our southern border and our jail 
system, the U.S. intelligence community even now does not have a formal model to 
collect homeland security intelligence inside the U.S. jail system.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can homeland security information be collected from the jail system, using 
existing resources and successfully contributing to the intelligence cycle?  
C. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
The CIA and NSA used the term “failure to imagine” to describe the intelligence 
community’s failure to prevent the September 11 attacks (Roemer, 2006). Since 
September 11, 2001, the intelligence community has expanded the role of local law 
enforcement as a key component in intelligence gathering (Velez-Villar, 2012). The first 
National Strategy for Homeland Security report, written in 2002, centered on the concept 
of uniting local, state, and federal departments to protect the homeland. “The Federal 
government must seek to utilize state and local knowledge about their communities and 
then share relevant information with the state and local entities in position to act on it” 
(United States Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 2002, p. 12). 
Many law enforcement agencies at the local and state levels have officers working 
on a joint terrorism task force (JTTF) or assigned to a counterterrorism assignment. 
“Since September 11, every state and many cities and counties are addressing homeland 




have established anti-terrorism task forces. Many have also published or are preparing 
homeland security strategies” (USDHS, 2002, p. 12). Major cities and counties in the 
United States published their affiliation with JTTFs and their counter-terrorism agendas. 
However, there is one jurisdiction at the local level with great homeland security 
intelligence potential that has received little attention: the jail system. 
D. JAILS VERSUS PRISONS 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term “jail” will be used to describe detention 
facilities and any correctional facility under city or county jurisdiction with offenders 
awaiting trial or serving short-term sentences. A “prison” will be defined as a state or 
federally operated correctional facility with offenders who are serving long-term 
sentences, typically more than two years. “Inmates” will be defined as offenders in the 
jail system, and “prisoners” will be defined as offenders in the prison system. This thesis 
is focused on the practical and strategic benefits of gathering intelligence from the jail 
system, which does not negate the fact that homeland security intelligence has a 
legitimate presence in the prison system. However, jails are distinct from prisons because 
the jail system provides very different and often better opportunities to cultivate 
informants and gather homeland security intelligence.  
Jails and prisons are operated by very different law enforcement agencies. Jails or 
detention facilities are under city or county jurisdiction with an inmate population 
accused of committing a crime within that local jurisdiction. A prison is a state-operated 
facility housing prisoners from all over the particular state (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
n.d.). Law enforcement or correctional officers at a state or federal level generally do not 
have personal knowledge of the community or the environment from which a particular 
prisoner comes; therefore, correctional officers are unlikely to be familiar with the 
homeland security potential of any individual prisoner. In contrast, law enforcement 
officers at a jail have a better gestalt understanding of homeland security threats and 
trends in the same jurisdiction where the inmate committed a crime.  
The jail system provides a rare opportunity to acquire intelligence that is both 




intelligence describes activity, relationships, and situations that currently exist or that are 
ongoing at the moment the information is acquired. The jail system offers an opportunity 
to gather real-time information since the inmate was removed from the existing 
environment and placed directly in a jail. Inmates possess real-time information about 
criminal activity occurring in a particular jurisdiction because they recently were part of 
that environment. Prisons, on the other hand, house prisoners who have already been 
incarcerated for an extended time (in a jail) while waiting for their trial and/or litigating 
their criminal cases in court, and they have finally been remanded to a prison to serve 
their sentences (Bureau of Justice Statistics, n.d.). Prisoners are often disconnected from 
the environment or community with which they associated prior to their arrest. Prisoners 
rarely have first-hand or time-sensitive information about criminal activity occurring in a 
certain jurisdiction because of the months or years they have spent incarcerated in the jail 
system prior to being transferred to the prison system.  
The jail system also provides strategically more leverage than a prison system. 
Law enforcement officers have a greater advantage when trying to gather homeland 
security information from an inmate who has recently been arrested than from a prisoner 
who has been convicted and sentenced. First, jail inmates are more willing to provide 
information to police in the hopes of winning a reduced sentence, knowing that a law 
enforcement officer can plead with the court for a reduced sentence and allow the inmate 
to work off the crime by providing information on other crimes.  
Prisoners are less motivated to assist law enforcement because they have already 
been sentenced to a specified amount of time, and their hope for a shortened sentence is 
greatly diminished. Prisoners are reluctant to assist law enforcement because the 
communities they come from, as time goes on, are sure to know of their arrest. If the 
prisoner is released from prison early, he could be branded as a “snitch,” or one who 
provides information to law enforcement. However, an inmate is sent to a jail directly 
after his arrest. Sometimes law enforcement officers will immediately recruit the inmate 
as an informant, release him from custody, and place him directly back into the 
environment to gather time-sensitive intelligence without the knowledge of anyone in his 




As mentioned above, the jail system provides a fertile ground for intelligence 
collection, and the U.S. intelligence community has not exploited the homeland security 
intelligence in the U.S. jail system. The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 was the first piece of 
legislature that encouraged and recommended that domestic intelligence agencies and 
local law enforcement agencies work together in collecting homeland security 
intelligence and improve coordination between both disciplines (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 25). 
The 9/11 attacks were the catalyst for the integration of domestic-intelligence agencies 
and local law enforcement agencies, but the U.S. jail system still remains an area 
untouched by the integration. A nationwide homeland security jail intelligence collection 
effort would be instrumental to the U.S. intelligence community by providing real-time 
actionable intelligence, but the intelligence community has yet to leverage the homeland 
security information in the U.S. jail system.  
E. NOTORIOUS TERRORISTS INCARCERATED IN THE JAIL SYSTEM  
1. Richard Reid  
Just a few months after the attacks of September 11, Richard Reid boarded a 
flight from Paris to Miami. While in flight he tried to light a fuse protruding from his 
shoe, which was packed with enough explosives to blow a hole in the fuselage of the 
aircraft (Elliott, 2002). During the course of the investigation of that incident, it was 
discovered that Reid had attended al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. European 
investigators eventually linked Reid to some of the best-known terrorist cells on the 
continent, but Reid’s criminal days had started long before becoming a member of al-
Qaeda (Elliott, 2002).  
Richard Reid was not born into Islam, much less radical Islam. Reid’s father, 
Robin Reid, was a career criminal, spending nearly 20 years inside London prisons. 
Robin converted to Islam in the 1980s. Richard dropped out of school at the age of 16 
and followed in his father’s footsteps, making a living as a criminal. He lived in South 
London and was involved in street crimes, including car thefts. Richard was arrested for 





and out of prisons and lived the life of a criminal. After Richard’s father converted to 
Islam, he began to urge Richard to convert to Islam as well. The next time Richard was 
incarcerated, he converted to Islam (Elliot, 2002). 
When Reid first converted to Islam in prison, he did not have extremist views. It 
was not until his release from prison in 1994 that Richard started to become radicalized. 
He attended the notorious Finsbury Park mosque, which had a reputation for teaching a 
radical form of Islam. A number of suspected terrorists have worshipped there, including 
convicted 9/11 accomplice Zacarias Moussaoui (Weiser, 2011). Al-Qaeda operatives 
Djamel Beghal and Kamel Daoudi also attended the Finsbury Park mosque with Reid. 
Beghal and Daoudi were both convicted of terrorism for conspiring to destroy the U.S. 
embassy in Paris (Elliot, 2002). Richard Reid, at one time a common criminal who spent 
much time in jail, knew some of the most notorious terrorists in the world. Not only did 
Richard associate with these men, he eventually became one of them. It is highly likely 
that Richard Reid might have spoken about his growing radicalization or revealed 
information about Moussaoui, Beghal, or Daoudi to a trained jail officer, or that another 
inmate might have happily informed on Reid in a South London jail if given the chance. 
A jail officer might have recognized the significance of the information and have known 
what to do with it (Weiser, 2011). A jail is an opportune setting to gather intelligence and 
cultivate informants.  
2. The “Toronto 18” Plot: Terrorists in the Canadian Correctional 
System  
The Correctional Services of Canada (CSC) is the federal correctional service 
with prisoners who have been sentenced to two years or more in a correctional facility. 
After 9/11, CSC expanded its intelligence unit to address terrorism-related concerns 
(Toews, 2011). Although CSC will not comment on its involvement in the foiled 2006 
plot of an Al-Qaeda Islamic terrorist cell, one leader believed to have played a major part 
in orchestrating the plot was in a CSC correctional facility. Ali Dirie was arrested in 2005 
for trying to smuggle two firearms into Canada from the United States. When Dirie was 
arrested he was traveling with another member of the terrorist cell, Yasin Abdi 




other members of the Islamic cell. From a correctional facility, Dirie recruited fellow 
inmates to participate in the plot and spread radical Islamic messages within the jail 
system (Teotonio, 2011). The 2006 plot involved a plan to detonate truck bombs and an 
elaborate design to attack the Canadian Broadcasting Center, the Canadian Parliament 
building, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s headquarters, and the 
parliamentary Peace Tower. The goal was to take hostages and behead the Prime Minister 
and other leaders. On June 2, 2006, a joint operation involving Canadian intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement agencies arrested 18 people and stopped the plot 
(Teotonio, 2011). 
3. Jose Padilla 
There are also examples in the United States of terrorists who have been 
incarcerated in the jail system prior to committing a terrorist act. Jose Padilla was born in 
Brooklyn, New York, but later moved to Chicago, Illinois, where he was first 
incarcerated. Padilla was a member of the Latin Kings street gang and was convicted of 
aggravated assault and manslaughter when he was a juvenile. According to Chicago 
police, Padilla was arrested five times between 1985 and 1991 (CNN.com, 2002). At the 
age of 20, Padilla was arrested in Sunrise, Florida, for brandishing a firearm during a road 
rage incident. Padilla spent 303 days in the Broward County jail. When Padilla was 
released from jail in 1992, he began traveling outside the United States (Saunders, 2004). 
In 2002, a senior al Qaeda official, Abu Zubydah, told authorities that Padilla was 
planning a terrorist attack in the United States. Padilla was arrested in Chicago on May 8, 
2002, on suspicion of plotting a radiological bomb attack in the United States (Saunders, 
2004). 
F. METROPOLITAN CITY EXAMPLE: THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
JAIL SYSTEM 
The county of Los Angeles is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse 
counties in the U.S. (United States Census 2010, 2011). Equally diverse is the Los 
Angeles County jail system, the largest jail system in the free world. The robust diversity 




homeland security information that could be gathered, analyzed, and provided to 
homeland security agencies. However, the Los Angeles County jail system does not have 
an organized process to gather homeland security information. 
Currently, the only information that is being extracted from Los Angeles jail 
inmates revolves around active gangs within the confines of Los Angeles County. A team 
of jail deputies, Operation Safe Jail (OSJ), is gathering information and supplying 
information to Operation Safe Streets (OSS), a law enforcement street gang unit, to fight 
Los Angeles County’s gang problem. OSJ searches cells, recruits informants, monitors 
inmate mail, and records inmate phone calls and visits. Since the implementation of OSJ 
in the early 1980s, OSJ has successfully used innovative tactics to extract current and 
timely information from jail inmates and has employed technology to enhance the 
information it gleans about street gangs, gang members, and gang activity.  
Beyond the scope of street gangs there exists untapped information regarding the 
counterfeiting of U.S. currency, illegal border-crossing activities, human trafficking, 
immigration fraud, terrorist activities (both domestic and in other parts of the world), and 
weapons smuggling. The preceding anecdotes of terrorists, who before their more deadly 
exploits, had been incarcerated in jails around the world, indicate the need for a homeland 
security intelligence team within the jail system. Large metropolitan police agencies like 
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) have been leaders in creating a 
homeland security strategy for the nation, but they have not yet gathered and cultivated 
homeland security information in their own jail systems. A U.S. homeland security jail 
intelligence model would enhance U.S. intelligence efforts by detecting and reacting to 
homeland security threats.  
G. HOMELAND SECURITY THREATS 
The Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002 in direct response to 
the 9/11 attacks. In the first National Strategy for Homeland Security report, the 
following were listed as threats posed to the U.S. homeland: “Threats posed by terrorists, 





cyber crime, and the destruction or theft of natural resources” (USDHS, 2002, p. 22). To 
address these threats, federal, state, and local agencies need to work together and partner 
in intelligence efforts.  
Successful counterterrorism efforts require that Federal, State, tribal, local, 
and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and 
collaboration capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, 
analyze, disseminate, and use information regarding threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, response, and 
consequence management efforts. (USDHS, 2005, p. 2) 
H. CONCLUSION 
Jails provide a controlled environment to implement the intelligence cycle. One of 
the fundamental recommendations of the 9/11 Commission report was to integrate all 
sources of information, which can then be inserted into the intelligence cycle (9/11 
Commission, 2004, p. 401). The U.S. jail system provides an opportunity to collect 
information utilizing methods that are not available outside the confines of a jail 
environment. Inmate visiting logs, recorded phone calls, cell searches, inmate out-going 
and incoming mail are all unique jail methods to collect information, and all are done 
without the need of a search warrant. Also, the intelligence community can capitalize on 
the fact that when people are arrested they are sent directly to a jail. This allows the 
intelligence community to exploit the recently arrested inmate’s current and actionable 
homeland security–related information. The intelligence community must leverage the 
unique opportunities that the U.S. jail environment offers.  
The Department of Homeland Security defines threats posed to the U.S. 
homeland. Those threats include drug cartels, organized crime, and illegal immigration, 
all of which are represented in a jail facility. The U.S. jail system is flooded with inmates 
who are charged with drug-related crimes, inmates who are connected to criminal 
organizations, and inmates who are illegal immigrants (Killebrew, 2009). Also, as 
mentioned above, there were a number of notorious terrorists who, at some point in their 
lives, spent time in a jail facility. If some of the most notorious terrorists spent time in a 




information. It is difficult to find an environment so rich in homeland security 
information as the U.S. jail system. This opportunity must be exploited.  
There are many threats that plague the United States, and it is spending billions to 
thwart these threats, but we have failed to take advantage of the vast homeland security 
information in the U.S. jail system. The intelligence community needs to leverage 
homeland security information found inside jail facilities and turn that information into 























II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Significant articles, empirical research articles, journals, books, government 
reports, academic studies, and research documents were reviewed through the Naval 
Postgraduate University library. Online databases also helped the search for pertinent 
literature. Bibliographic and reference listings were accessed from appropriate titles 
discovered in the review process. Approximately 75 current scholarly articles pertaining 
to jail, jail intelligence, intelligence cycle, U.S. intelligence, homeland security jail 
intelligence, jail information, terrorism and jail, and terrorism and prison, were reviewed.  
What is intelligence? “The term intelligence refers to the steps or stages in 
intelligence, from policy makers [an intelligence consumer] perceiving a need for 
information to the [intelligence] community’s delivery of an analytical intelligence 
product to them.” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 55) The U.S. intelligence community commonly 
has five phases that make up the intelligence cycle (Lowenthal, 2009). The five phases 
are 1) planning and direction, 2) collection, 3) processing and exploitation, 4) analysis 
and production, and 5) dissemination and intregration (GlobalSecurity, n.d.).  
A. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE  
Successful counterterrorism efforts require that federal, state, tribal, local, 
and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and 
collaboration capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, 
analyze, disseminate, and use information regarding threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, response, and 
consequence-management efforts. (USDHS, 2005, p. 2)  
The intelligence cycle is a process of turning information into intelligence and 
subsequently making it available to a consumer. There are a number of variants of the 







Figure 1.   The Intelligence Cycle (from Global Security, n.d.) 
1. Planning and Direction 
The planning and direction managers oversee the intelligence community’s efforts 
by determining intelligence requirements, formulating specific collection, processing, 
analysis, and data dissemination. Planning and direction managers are homeland security 
members at a supervisory level, from FBI and DHS supervisors to local JTTF managers, 
who consider the needs of the intelligence consumer and direct the intelligence collection 
efforts. The intelligence managers must be in close rapport with their policy counterparts 
and take the initiative to build the momentum of the intelligence cycle (Johnson & Wirtz, 
2011). “In the end, intelligence managers have to make decisions about the subjects that 
ought to be covered.” (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 65) 
2. Collection 
The collection phase gathers raw information based on the directives and plans of 
the intelligence community (Iowa Department of Public Safety, n.d.). “Collection 




community utilizes five methods to collect information: 1) human intelligence 
(HUMINT), 2) signals intelligence (SIGINT), 3) geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 4) 
measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and 5) open-source intelligence 
(OSINT) (Lowenthal, 2009). Each of these methods will be discussed in depth in the next 
section.  
3. Processing and Exploitation 
The processing-and-exploitation phase receives raw information from the 
collection phase and converts it into a form suitable for analysis. This process includes 
transcribing, translating, decrypting, and entering the data collected into databases where 
it can be exploited during the analysis and production phase (Iowa Department of Public 
Safety, n.d.).  
4. Analysis and Production 
The analysis-and-production phase converts raw information into intelligence by 
integrating, evaluating, and analyzing available data. “Identifying requirements, 
conducting collection, and processing and exploitation are meaningless unless the 
intelligence is given to analysts who are experts in their respective fields and can turn the 
intelligence into reports that respond to the needs of the policy makers [the intelligence 
consumer]” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 56). This phase puts the information into context and 
then produces an intelligence product. This phase also includes an evaluation of the 
intelligence that ensures development and improvement of intelligence collection efforts. 
The finished intelligence product is used to “connect the dots” by forming associations, 
drawing conclusions, and putting the information into context (Iowa Department of 
Public Safety, n.d.).  
5. Dissemination and Integration 
The dissemination-and-integration phase distributes the intelligence products to 
the policy maker or the intelligence consumer. “These [intelligence] products include 
warning intelligence, in which consumers are alerted to ‘breaking news’; current 




knowledge; in-depth studies on particular situations or issues; and forecasts of the future, 
the estimate.” (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 68) This phase also evaluates the value of the 
intelligence provided and provides feedback to the intelligence community.  
This phase also solicits feedback from the policy maker or intelligence consumer 
to those who collect, process, analyze, and produce intelligence products for them. The 
feedback portion of the intelligence cycle is crucial because it provides insight for the 
intelligence community to refine and/or redirect its intelligence collection efforts.  
Although feedback does not occur nearly as often as the intelligence 
community might desire, a dialogue between intelligence consumers and 
producers should take place after the intelligence has been received. 
Policy makers [intelligence consumers] should give the intelligence 
community some sense of how well their intelligence requirements are 
being met and discuss any adjustments that need to be made to any parts 
of the process. Ideally, this should happen while the issue or topic is still 
relevant, so that improvements and adjustments can be made. Failing that, 
even an ex post facto review can be tremendously helpful. (Lowenthal, 
2009, p. 56)  
The dissemination-and-integration phase is the last phase and logically feeds 
directly back into the planning-and-direction phase to begin the cycle all over (United 
States Military Information, 2012). 
The FBI lists five intelligence collection methods, referred to as “INTs,” which 
collect information that is then implemented into the intelligence cycle (FBI, n.d.). The 
five intelligence collection INTs are 1) human intelligence (HUMINT), 2) signals 
intelligence (SIGINT), 3) geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), 4) measurement and 
signatures intelligence (MASINT), and 5) open-source intelligence (OSINT) (Lowenthal, 
2009). 
B. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION METHODS 
1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the use of human sources or informants to 
collect information. HUMINT is also refered to as the world’s second-oldest profession; 




the Jews across the Jordan River (Lowenthal, 2009). Human sources are not CIA spies 
but are sources recruited by spies or members of the intelligence community to collect 
information (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 68). There are typically five steps to recruiting 
sources, known as the “agent acquistion cycle.” In his book Intelligence: From Secrets to 
Policy, Lowenthal describes the steps (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 97): 
1. Targeting and spotting: identifying individuals who have access to the 
information that the United States may desire. 
2. Assessing: gaining their confidence and assessing their weakness and 
susceptiblity to be recruited. 
3. Recruiting: making a pitch to them, suggesting a relationship.  
4. Handling: managing the asset. 
5. Termination: ending the relationship for any of several reasons, e.g., 
unreliability, loss of access to needed intelligence, change in intelligence 
requirements.  
2. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) refers to the information collected through 
electronic transmissions. This includes communications that travel via electronic and/or 
satellite means. Wiretaps, telephones, and personal computers are all examples of 
SIGINT (FBI, n.d.). 
3. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) 
Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is also known as imagery intelligence. This 
type of intelligence collection method refers to photography. In recent times, GEOINT 





4. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) 
Measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) is an intelligence-collection 
discipline that consists of weapons systems and/or military capability (Johnson & Wirtz, 
2011). MASINT uses data gathered by the GEOINT and SIGINT collection systems to 
provide information about other nations’ military preparedness. For example, MASINT 
measures emissions of a factory to determine whether the factory is a pharmaceutical 
factory or a factory producing chemical or biological substances (FBI, n.d.).  
5. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) 
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is any information obtained by public sources 
of information. These sources include newspapers, radio, televison, and public 
information on the internet (FBI, n.d.).  
The figure below depicts the manner in which the intelligence cycle (IC) is 
combined with the requirements of intelligence consumers and intelligence managers and 
the different ways to collect intelligence. “The flow is circular, going in endless loops.” 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 35) Any jail intelligence model will fit into the “collection” box, on 
the execution side of Lowenthal’s dotted line. For best results and most widespread 
implementation, however, a best-practice jail intelligence model must be birthed on the 
management side of the diagram (or at least in the “systems development” box). The rest 
of this thesis will review previous domestic jail intelligence models, offer a hybrid best-
practice model, and present all the basic information needed for planning and direction 





Figure 2.   Alternative Ways of Looking at the Intelligence Community: A Functional 
View (from Lowenthal, 2009, p. 34) 
C. U.S. JAIL INTELLIGENCE MODELS 
The literature review reveals no significant articles, empirical research, journals, 
books, government reports, or academic studies that have been put forth to establish, 
document, or even propose a successful homeland security jail intelligence model. A 
“successful” model in this case must be focused on homeland security, be resilient, and 
have documented outcomes. The existing literature on jail intelligence models does not 
describe any homeland security intelligence models within the jail system. The literature 
shows that jail intelligence models related to gangs and narcotics do exist. One particular 
document describes a jail intelligence model that collects intelligence on all crimes 





in the document fail to report any homeland security intelligence collected during the six-
month course of the study (Matthews, 2006). This thesis will contribute new case study 
research to an area where virtually none exists.  
This literature review examines different jail intelligence models within jails in 
the United States. The first section focuses on homeland security jail intelligence models, 
and the second section takes a broad look at jail intelligence models that focus on gangs, 
crime prevention, and the enhancement of public safety.  
1. 2006 COPS Innovations Jail Model 
In 2006, the assistant chief constable for Dallas County, John Matthews, 
developed and authored the COPS (Community Oriented Policing) jail intelligence 
model. The model was designed to be applicable nationwide, with flexible parameters 
that allow the model to be implemented in any jail system. The jail intelligence model’s 
mission is: “To develop a national model to collect jail-based intelligence and 
disseminate it to appropriate law enforcement agencies in order to solve and/or prevent 
crimes and improve public safety.” (Matthews, 2006, p. 4)  
The model has five steps: 1) gather the intelligence, 2) document the intelligence, 
3) validate the intelligence, 4) disseminate the intelligence to appropriate agencies, and 5) 
request feedback from the agencies that received the intelligence.  
A search of the literature about COPS reveals an incomplete and unbalanced 
discussion of whether there is a need for a homeland security jail intelligence model. One 
of the objectives of the COPS jail intelligence model case study was to collect homeland 
security intelligence; however, results do not report that it actually produced any 
homeland security intelligence. Also, the case study indicated that the COPS research of 
a jail intelligence model was funded by a grant, but it is unclear how the grant money was 
used to implement the jail intelligence models in the three jail facilities. These gaps in the 
knowledge about the COPS jail intelligence model have not been adequately studied, and 
further information would help create a more robust context in which other jail 
intelligence models can be compared and contrasted. It does seem clear, however, that the 




in what we need to know to determine whether a homeland security jail intelligence 
model would be needed, and if so, what model would yield the most intelligence. 
Because of this, the COPS model contributes no insights toward identifying the traits of a 
successful homeland security jail intelligence model. 
2. Gang/Jail Radicalization Jail Intelligence Model: Los Angeles County, 
Operation Safe Jail 
One of the best examples that the literature review yielded was based in Los 
Angeles, California. In the Los Angeles County jail system, Operation Safe Jail (OSJ) 
was created in 1985 in order to proactively collect gang intelligence and to disseminate 
the intelligence to appropriate gang units (Mead, 2007). Today, OSJ analyzes gang 
trends, interviews inmates who are identified as gang members, and maintains a gang 
intelligence file. What do other law enforcement officials and scholars think of OSJ? 
“Former police chief Bratton in a year-end report to the Los Angeles City Council noted 
that ‘OSJ simply rocks. I wish every special program were as awesome as this one.’” 
(Mead, 2007)  
In July of 2005, a radical prison group, Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam is-Sheen (JIS), was 
discovered in California’s Folsom State Prison. After an intense investigation, homeland 
security intelligence revealed a direct correlation between gang members and tenets of 
radical Islam. OSJ noticed, documented, and reported a trend in the Los Angeles County 
jail system of hard-core gang member inmates converting to radical Islam. In direct 
response to radical Islam’s recruiting within the jail system, OSJ assigned two deputies to 
work full time to address the Los Angeles County’s jail radicalization problem. 
Operation Safe Jails gang intelligence deputies monitor inmate population for 
radical activity. The deputies identify inmates who are spreading radical Islam, monitor 
their activities, and report the inmate to the appropriate agencies. According to OSJ’s 
mission, the model’s primary focus is gang activity and, most recently, gang members 
who have converted to radical Islam.  
The literature reveals that two OSJ deputies are assigned to jail radicalization, but 




analyzed, or how they share intelligence with other agencies. Finally, the literature does 
not reveal how OSJ is funded or whether the federal government subsidizes the Islamic 
radicalization prevention efforts.  
3. Webb County Jail, “Jail Intelligence Unit” 
Webb County is in Texas, nestled along the U.S.-Mexico border. The Webb 
County jail is full of violent drug offenders who are gang members affiliated with 
powerful Mexican drug cartels (Guerra, n.d.). In 2009, Sheriff Marin Cuellar asked the 
Webb County jail to formulate a strategic plan for a jail intelligence unit. The Webb 
County Sheriff’s Office applied for a grant and received $763,615 to fund a jail 
intelligence unit for a two-year period (Guerra, n.d.). 
The Webb County Jail Intelligence Unit (WCJIU) is made up of two full-time 
crime analysts, intelligence consultants, and an array of cutting-edge technology to 
further its efforts (Guerra, n.d.). The intricacies of the model were not published due to 
fear that, if the operational details were revealed, it could hinder the model’s 
effectiveness. Four months after the unit’s creation, the model discovered a murder plot 
in a Texas prison; discovered how inmates used chain clips to create weapons; and 
exposed a gang who was bringing narcotics into the jail by using the U.S. mail (Guerra, 
n.d.).  
The literature about the WCJIU does not expound on its undergirding ideas or the 
intelligence dissemination protocol for the model. Furthermore, it does not say whether 
(or how) the Webb County jail model shared its drug intelligence with the Drug 
Enforcement Bureau or the U.S. postal inspectors. The literature does not specify how, 
after the federal funding of the Webb County Jail Intelligence Model runs out, the model 
might continue its work. The literature did show that the WCJIU yielded homeland 
security intelligence relating to drugs, but the Webb County jail model appears to focus 




4. Jacksonville, Florida: Jail Intelligence Model 
The Jacksonville, Florida Sheriff’s Office has an average inmate population of 
3,800 (Tenah, n.d.). The Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office created a jail intelligence model to 
collect jail-based intelligence on internal and external safety and security issues (Tenah, 
n.d.). The Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office jail intelligence model consists of a specialized 
jail intelligence unit, a crime analysis unit, civilian jail personnel, and jail guards. The 
first inmate intelligence is collected during the intake process when inmates are initially 
arrested. Intelligence such as place of birth, address, next of kin, and tattoos are collected 
as potentially significant. Collectors also obtain intelligence through visiting logs, inmate 
phone calls, other inmates, and inmate property searches.  
When intelligence is collected, the crime analysis unit then validates the 
intelligence. The crime analysis unit utilizes traditional databases, law enforcement 
databases, geography, and analytical software. Once the intelligence is validated by the 
crime analysis unit, the intelligence is disseminated to various internal representatives or 
external homeland security agencies. The Jacksonville, Florida’s jail intelligence model 
documents the successful resolution of cases that involved gangs, narcotics, burglary, and 
identity theft (Tenah, n.d.) The literature reveals that Jacksonville’s jail intelligence 
model is focused on crimes within its jail system and street-level crimes that plague 
Jacksonville. Jacksonville’s model did not reference homeland security activity, 
homeland security training for personnel, or any formal attempt to analyze homeland 
security intelligence. 
D. CONCLUSION  
The United States has a wide variety of formal methods to collect information. 
These methods cover the gamut of intelligence collection. The intelligence cycle offers a 
formal model to direct, collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The model 
has been incorporated at the local, state, and federal levels, domestically and 
internationally. Although the intelligence cycle is occasionally modified, the core practice 
remains the same and has proved to be successful. However, the U.S. jail system has 




Literature pertaining to jail intelligence models consists largely of correctional 
departments publicizing their policing efforts within their correctional systems. This 
literature focuses on departments forming jail intelligence models to obtain information 
about jail-related crimes, gangs, and narcotics.2 Aside from the WCJIU, none of the U.S. 
jail intelligence models indicate how the models were funded, and the WCJIU’s funding 
does not appear to be stable over the long term. The literature did not expand on how the 
jail intelligence models were formed or how the jail intelligence models operated, with 
the exception of two correctional systems: the Webb County jail system and the 
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.  
Based on the literature review, none of the extant jail intelligence models have 
intentionally incorporated any focus on homeland security. There is not a single proven 
homeland security jail intelligence model in America today. According to the Homeland 
Security Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative, “important intelligence that may 
forewarn of a future attack may be derived from information collected by State, tribal, 
and local government personnel through crime control and other routine activities and/or 
by people living and working in our local communities” (USDHS, 2005, p. 3). The U.S. 
jail system posesses homeland security information, and the intelligence community can 
collect HUMINT and SIGINT in the jail system without a warrant and by leveraging the 
rapport that a custodial officer can build with an inmate. The information can then be 
contributed to the intelligence cycle, which will inform policy makers and direct 
homeland security collection efforts. Nearly 11 years after the attacks of September 11, 
2001, a successful jail intelligence model to collect homeland security intelligence does 
not exist.  
 
                                                 
2 Because of the unhelpful and irrelevant nature of this common literature, none of it was included in 




III. RESEARCH MODEL 
The goal of this research was to seek an effective homeland security jail 
intelligence model able to gather real-time actionable homeland security intelligence 
from the jail system. The case study method was selected to compare and analyze 
homeland security intelligence models in the United States to create a “best practice” jail 
intelligence model. The case study method was selected for its use of empirical inquiry to 
answer the “how” question. Also, a case study focuses on a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, and boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
always clearly evident (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). The use of the 
case study method aids in the examination of best practices: in the present study, it is the 
most helpful approach to analyze current intelligence collection models at the federal and 
local levels. Examining both local and federal intelligence collection efforts in this niche 
will be particularly helpful to this study. 
A. SAMPLE DATA  
This research examines three intelligence models: the Terrorism Liaison Officer 
model (TLO), the Jail Information Team (JIT) model, and the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
JTTF (JTTF) model. These models were chosen because they collect information that 
could be used as actionable intelligence. They differ in their specific missions, but their 
overarching goal is the same: to collect intelligence. Each of these models is ongoing and 
considered successful. These case studies were limited in scope due to the sensitive 
nature of intelligence collection, the information available at the unclassified level, and 
the number of years that each model has existed. The sample data included in this 
research was selected because it offered an opportunity to explore intelligence models at 
the federal and local levels. Through a combination model of federal and local agencies, a 
“best practice” intelligence model is proposed. The sample data includes reports, articles, 
policy and procedure memos, and discussions I had during the course of employment 
with the LASD and a role in the creation of the Los Angeles County Jail Interview Team 




1. Los Angeles County Jail Interviewing Team (JIT) 
The data samples include the model’s policy and procedures, discussions with JIT 
members prior to the research for this thesis, and statistical data about the number of 
interviews conducted by the JIT during the specified time. The author was one of the 
three cocreators of the JIT at Los Angeles County’s Men’s Central Jail. 
2. Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Model 
These data samples include a published book, Terrorism Early Warning: 10 Years 
of Achievement in Fighting Terrorism and Crime. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Lieutenant, John P. Sullivan, was the primary author of the book and one of the 
cocreators of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group. The data samples include 
articles and theses that describe this model. The Terrorism Early Warning program was 
not a case study; however, the TLO concept depicted in the TEW model can serve as a 
case study. I have been a TLO in Los Angeles County since 2009. 
3. Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Model  
These data samples are included in a document from the Rand Corporation 
(2003), Intelligence, Police, and Counterterrorism: Assessing Post-9/11 Initiatives. The 
samples also include articles, models, The 9/11 Commission Report, and a commentary 
by Brian Jenkins titled Connect the Cops to Connect the Dots. I worked on a JTTF in Los 
Angeles from 2007 to 2009 and worked at the Los Angeles Joint Intelligence Center 
(LAJRIC) from 2006 to 2009.  
B. DATA COLLECTION  
Data was either collected during my normal course of employment, in my 
possession prior to this research, or available online and collected from the worldwide 
web.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
The case study is an examination of three successful intelligence models, defined 




Each case study was analyzed, and the positives and negatives of each model were 
extracted to answer “how” and “why” these intelligence models are successful in 
gathering intelligence. The study proposes to examine these three models as case studies, 
identifying the similarities and differences between them, analyzing why one model was 
more successful than the next, matching the insights thus gleaned, considering the 
phenomena that emerge, and finally, synthesizing the emerging patterns into a “best 
practice” jail intelligence model. 
Yin’s case study design analysis was utilized for this study. “Research design 
links the data to be collected and conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of the 
study—it provides a conceptual framework and an action plan for getting from questions 
to a set of conclusions” (Yin, 1994, p. 2). The case studies involving successful 
intelligence models in the United States were evaluated through pattern matching, 
success stories, and each model’s proven sustainable resiliency in relation to the 
intelligence cycle. The proposition was the starting point for data analysis. Also, 
observation and participation with each case model were other evaluation techniques 
utilized.  
The distinctiveness of each intelligence model was extracted to reveal the rising 
fundamentals that made that model successful. The case study method provided insight to 
the development of an intelligence model that would perform well in a jail environment.  
D. THEORETICAL SENSITIVITY: ADDRESSING BIAS 
Bias is a form of systematic error that can affect data analysis during a case study 
research design. When a human evaluates research, there may be a bias or sensitivity that 
unduly influences evaluation. Some biases stem from religious, cultural, political, and 
professional perspectives and can profoundly shape a person’s analysis.  
I worked in law enforcement for 15 years and have worked in a homeland security 
role since 2004. In 2004, I worked as a law enforcement security contractor in Iraq and 
Jordan. Also, I have been a TLO since 2009, worked at the Los Angeles Joint Regional 




to the Los Angeles JTTF for three years. Since 2004, I have completed several different 
kinds of homeland security training and worked in an intelligence-gathering role. 
Over the past 15 years, I spent four years working in the Los Angeles County jail 
system. From 2009 to 2010, I worked at the Los Angeles County’s Men’s Central Jail 
and codeveloped a pilot homeland security jail intelligence team. Based on personal and 
professional relationships with members of federal, state, and local agencies, I discussed 
strategy in intelligence gathering related to the jail system prior to the writing of this 
thesis. Because of my work experience in the intelligence community, my role in the 
development of a homeland security jail intelligence team, and my personal and 
professional relationships, I have a personal understanding of the intelligence community, 
the jail environment, and TLO and JTTF models. With this in mind, I was mindful during 
the analysis and synthesis to mitigate any bias while examining the data (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990; Trochim & Donnelly, 2006). I worked closely with my thesis advisors to 




IV METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
A. CASE STUDIES: INTELLIGENCE MODELS 
This thesis examines three successful intelligence models, examining them for 
parts and principles that can be used to synthesize a new jail intelligence model that 
combines the strengths of all three. These three models were selected due to their 
diversity from one another, their adaptability to a jail setting, and their ability to be 
successfully implemented by all large and small jail systems across the United States. 
Two of the models have been successfully implemented outside a jail environment, and 
one of the models was a pilot program similar to the COPS Jail Information Team 
program examined earlier. This one is focused specifically on discovering and developing 
homeland security intelligence and has experienced limited success in a jail setting in Los 
Angeles. Each case study will look at the model’s history and purpose.  
B. TERRORISM LIAISON OFFICER (TLO) HISTORY 
The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) is a program developed through the 
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) by Anthony 
Lukin. Lukin owns a consulting agency, Lukin and Associates, which does international 
consulting, offering specialized training in counterterrorism, security, and criminal 
activity. Lukin created the program in 2005–2006 to intersect first responders with each 
other and the intelligence community on a national basis, creating a domestic 
antiterrorism training program for first responders that would “improve the 
communication, cooperation and coordination between local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies” (Public Intelligence, 2010, p. 10). After 9/11, Lukin looked for 
ways for the law enforcement community to contribute to homeland security efforts put 
forth by the FBI. The program, which started in California, proved to be a success and 
has now been implemented all over the nation (Reyes, 2010). The chart below depicts 






Figure 3.   TLO Basic “First Responder” Model (from Public Intelligence, 2010) 
The program was welcomed by the homeland security community and 
implemented nationwide, encompassing law enforcement, military, firefighters, and other 
emergency responders. The TLO program, although viewed by many law enforcement 
officers as a program strictly for law enforcement, includes many members of the private 
sector and the first-responder community. As of 2008, over 25 fusion centers across the 
United States have implemented the TLO program in their jurisdictions, and dozens of 
other states are reportedly preparing to implement the program. According to an article in 
the Washington Post, there are at least 181 TLOs in Colorado, and their employments 
range from paramedics to utility workers, all with a shared mission: in their normal 
course of duty, to report suspicious activity to the appropriate agency 
(Washingtonpost.com, n.d.). As TLOs, they have both the training and the 
communication channels to do so (Public Intelligence, 2010). 
Model. The TLO program prepares designated law enforcement officers to act as 
liaisons between first-responder agencies, interdepartmental entities, and other law 




and the wide spectrum of the intelligence community. Stakeholders include members in 
the intelligence community, homeland security policy makers, first responders, and 
politicians. According the TLO mission, “the TLO is a collaborator, a coordinator, and a 
conduit, an instructor and facilitator, a person with the answers to questions concerning 
terrorism and the resources to retrieve those answers if not immediately known.” (Public 
Intelligence, n.d., p. 10) The TLO program provides counterterrorism training to local 
and state law enforcement officials. The TLO course curriculum was developed to give 
liaisons an understanding of their duties and responsibilities and a foundational 
knowledge of terrorism in the United States. There are two TLO courses of study, one 
basic eight-hour course and one advanced 24-hour course.  
The TLO advanced course curriculum includes the following classes: 
• The Terrorist Threat 
•  Force Protection 
•  Community Information Networking 
•  Fourth Generation Warfare 
•  International Terrorism 
•  Militant Islam 
•  Informational Terrorism 
•  Domestic Terrorism 
•  Critical Incident Stress Management 
•  Cross Cultural Communications 
•  Related Agency Roles and Responsibilities 
•  The National Emergency Management System 
•  Connecting and Working with the Private Sector 
•  The Role of the Office of Domestic Preparedness 
•  Developing Community Anti-Terrorism Awareness Progress  
(Public Intelligence, n.d.) 
The TLO model was designed as a collateral duty. Each liaison serves within its 




This model allows more agencies to participate in the program and thus maximizes TLO 
numbers and diversity of roles. The duties of a TLO are to educate coworkers and/or the 
agency to identify homeland security–related information. TLOs are not to investigate 
terrorism tips and leads but are to ensure that information is reported to the proper 
authorities, such as the FBI or the local fusion center. The TLO is the middle person, who 
is responsible to teach coworkers and/or the agency about potential threats and also to 
report terrorism-related information in a correct and timely manner. The TLOs also serve 
as a point of contact within their respective agencies, for fusion center detectives, agents, 
or directors and other homeland security personnel.  
C. JAIL INTELLIGENCE TEAM (JIT) 
1. History 
Los Angeles County Sheriff Department (LASD) Deputies Skyler Bryant, Clark 
Theodore, and myself, LASD Sergeant Jennifer Barsh, created the Jail Intelligence Team 
in 2009. Prior to being promoted to the rank of sergeant, I was a detective in the LASD 
Homeland Security Unit. During my three years in the unit, I worked as a case analyst at 
the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (LAJRIC), which serves as the local 
fusion center. I also worked part-time as a detective on a JTTF and had a top-secret 
clearance. When I was promoted to sergeant, I transferred to the Men’s Central Jail, 
which is the largest jail in the United States. Men’s Central Jail houses over 5,000 
inmates, including low-level, medium-level, high-level, and maximum-security inmates. 
During my assignment to Men’s Central Jail, I worked as a line supervisor who 
supervised line deputies’ interactions with inmates. Over a short period of time, I started 
to develop a rapport with inmates from countries I have visited or inmates with whom I 
practiced my foreign-language skills.  
During conversations with certain inmates, some of which involved practicing my 
Spanish or Arabic, I began to see in the jail system a wide range of information pertinent 
to homeland security but without an organized method to gather the information. Deputy 
Skyler Bryant and Deputy Clark Theodore also had the same experience as they came 




I supervised a number of deputies who had impressive military backgrounds in 
intelligence. Two deputies with prior military experience, Bryant and Theodore, 
expressed interest in the LASD’s Homeland Security unit. As we talked, each of us 
became convinced of the need to create a homeland security intelligence–gathering team 
at Men’s Central Jail. With the approval of Men’s Central Jail Captain Daniel Cruz, we 
created the Jail Interview Team.  
Email was sent to deputies at Men’s Central Jail inquiring about their desire to be 
involved, their language skills, military background, and homeland security area of 
expertise. We used that data and those volunteers to form a JIT pilot program.  
2. Model 
The JIT program is a collateral duty and utilizes jail deputies who already work 
directly with inmates in inmate housing. A duty post within inmate housing provided JIT 
members with the opportunity to spot, assess, and recruit inmates who potentially had 
homeland security–related information. For the JIT program to be successful, its 
members needed training to identify valid homeland security information. Each member 
was sent through the basic TLO course and a custom-tailored JIT training program. The 
JIT training program consisted of interview training, tours of the LAJRIC, learning how 
to send the fusion center a tip or a lead, and JIT policy and procedures (Los Angeles 
County, 2010). Although the JIT model includes a training component of the TLO model, 
the two are quite distinct. Beyond their obvious structural differences, they differ in their 
approach to collecting information. The JIT model is built on a proactive approach to 
collecting homeland security information, whereas the TLO model is reactive and abides 
by the DHS’ concept that “if you see something, say something.” 
3. Analysis 
The Men’s Central Jail consists of two inmate-housing wings of three floors each 
and a medical wing. The JIT program was designed to have a JIT member on every floor 
and on every shift. Each wing had a JIT leader on each shift who served as a liaison 
between the LAJRIC and the JIT members in his wing. Prior to each shift, the JIT leaders 




for information from homeland security agencies or the fusion center. The JIT members 
also updated the JIT leader about any homeland security tip or lead they had received 
from inmates and sent to the fusion center.  
Once per shift the JIT leaders briefed the JIT sergeant on information from the 
fusion center, JIT members’ inmate interviews, and any requests from JIT members. 
Once a month all JIT members met to discuss the status of completed interviews, 
strategies, tactics, upcoming training, and requests from the fusion center. Homeland 
security detectives, analysts, and fusion center members were invited to further the JIT’s 
efforts. Figure 4 depicts the information flow. When a JIT member gathered homeland 
security–related information, he would send a tip or lead into the LAJRIC. If the JIT 
member had a specific homeland security detective with whom he worked, he would also 
send the tip or lead to that detective. 
When a deputy sends a tip or lead to a homeland security detective, the deputy 
specifies that the fusion center has received the tip and needs to deconflict with the fusion 
center. For instance, if a JIT member sends the LAJRIC a lead about the Sinaloa Cartel, 
the JIT member also forwards the lead to the DEA detective working the Sinaloa Cartel. 
This redundancy was created because if a lead was sent in on a Friday and the fusion 
center had a small skeleton crew on the weekend, the detective might not receive the lead 
until Monday. Oftentimes, information received is time sensitive; forwarding information 
directly to the DEA detectives therefore provides a better opportunity for the DEA to act 
on the information.  
An inmate can be released from jail at any time: therefore, the JIT maximizes the 
homeland security community’s opportunity to act on real-time information by ensuring 
that the appropriate detective is immediately aware of the information. The redundancy 
ensures that the homeland security community is also receiving real-time actionable 
information. Figure 4 shows that information flows all three ways, and it must do so. It is 
imperative that the detectives and the fusion center continually evaluate the information, 








Figure 4.   JIT Information flow 
D. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) 
1. History 
The JTTF concept initially started in 1979 in New York City. New York City had 
a surge in major bank robberies, which fall within the jurisdiction of both the New York 
City Police Department (NYPD) and the FBI. Federally insured bank deposits provide 
the jurisdictional grounds for FBI, and the crime of robbery is a state crime, which is the 
jurisdiction of the NYPD. The FBI’s mission is to protect the citizens and the security of 
the nation, and the NYPD’s mission is to protect the citizens in New York City. 
Therefore, the FBI and NYPD came together and formed a Joint Bank Robbery Task 
Force. The joint task force proved to be effective because it combined the NYPD’s street 
knowledge with the FBI’s resources; the bank robbery cases were solved.  
In April of 1980, the FBI and the NYPD were in another predicament involving 
the jurisdiction of the FBI and the NYPD. New York City had an increase in terrorist 
attacks, so the NYPD and the FBI joined forces again to create the first Joint Terrorism 




and 10 New York Police detectives. As the JTTF grew, it pursued threats from the Armed 
Forces of National Liberation (FALN), the Croatian Independence Movement, the 
Weather Underground, the Black Liberation Army, and a number of other domestic and 
international terrorist groups. The JTTF focused on gathering intelligence from the 
community and using that intelligence to thwart or prevent attacks (Valiquette, 2010). 
The JTTF’s recorded success stories spread throughout the nation.  
2. Model  
There are 104 JTTFs across the nation, 71 of which were created after 9/11. 
According to the FBI, there are more than 4,400 JTTF members in the United States, 
encompassing over 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies. The Department 
of Homeland Security, the U.S. military, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug 
Enforcement, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and the FBI are a few of the federal 
agencies that make up the 104 existing JTTFs in the nation (FBI, 2004)  
The JTTFs consist of small cells from local, state, and federal agencies. Each cell 
is locally based and has experienced detectives, analysts, linguists, and tactical operators. 
Success stems from the diverse expertise and community awareness that frames each 
JTTF. When a JTTF is created, it recruits from a pool of talents, skills, and a diverse 
knowledge base to form one multiagency team with the ability to respond together with a 
cohesive approach. The JTTF has the ability to investigate, collect intelligence, share 
intelligence, and analyze intelligence. This model fortifies information sharing, 
intelligence gathering, and multiagency collaboration, so that when a multiagency 


















































V. PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
A. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The primary goal of this research effort is to develop baseline substantive theory 
and a conceptual systems framework for gathering homeland security information from 
the jail system. The research seeks to understand how and why certain intelligence 
collection models were successful in their specific environment and then use that data to 
examine how to create a homeland security jail intelligence model. As mentioned in the 
methodology section of this thesis, tools were used to reveal how the three case studies 
were developed in different contexts. Each case study was examined for its ability to 
continually maneuver through the intelligence cycle’s five stages. The data collected for 
the analysis comes from literature, my observations, personal experience with each model 
in Los Angeles County, my professional relationships with a number of local, state, and 
federal agencies, and many discussions that I had with members from the Terrorism 
Liaison Officer (TLO), Los Angeles County Jail Interview Team (JIT), and Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) programs.  
The analysis of the case study uses the qualitative research method. This term 
broadly refers to “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of 
statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 17). 
Quantitative research seeks to generalize, predict, and determine findings whereas a 
qualitative researcher seeks to examine, understand, and illuminate similar situations. My 
aim is to examine, compare, and contrast each program via the published literature, my 
professional experience, and my personal familiarity with each model.  
In his book Beyond the Two Disciplines of Scientific Psychology, Lee Cronbach 
claims that quantitative research is not able to take full account of the many interaction 
effects that take place in social settings. He has stated that “the time has come to exorcise 
the null hypothesis” because it ignores effects that may be important but that are not 
statistically significant (1975, p. 124). Qualitative inquiry accepts the complex and 




Los Angeles jail system, my experience as a detective assigned to a JTTF, my knowledge 
gained while working as an intelligence analyst at the LAJRIC fusion center, and my 
previous homeland security jail information team research to extrapolate the 
idiosyncrasies, as well as the pervasive uniqueness of each case study in a social world. 
Keep in mind that these case models vary between state and state. Organizational culture 
and personal relationships can increase or decrease the models’ momentum as they 
proceed around the intelligence cycle. The analysis will generalize each model without 
taking into consideration all the various personal and professional relationships which 
may increase or hinder the movement around the intelligence cycle. “Moreover, 
personalities do matter. However much people like to think of government as one of laws 
and institutions, the personalities and relationships of those filling important positions 
affect agency working relations.” (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 38)  
1. Resources 
“Resources” refers to financial, personnel, physical, and available-time resources 
for each model to complete each phase. Personnel resources include the number of 
personnel and the number of hours those personnel can dedicate to the homeland security 
jail interview model. Physical resources include the technology, equipment, analytical 
databases, intelligence databases, and security clearances needed to view classified 
information. “The love of money is not only the root of all evil; money is also the root of 
all government. How much gets spent and who decides are fundamental powers” 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 50).  
2. Training and Expertise 
“Training and expertise” refers to the knowledge combined with expertise and the 
availability for continual training required to maneuver the model through each phase.  
3. Information Sharing 
“Information sharing” is the ability to share information with multiple agencies 





intelligence reports, and criminal reports. “The 2004 intelligence reform law puts a major 
emphasis on information sharing, which is an important aspect of all intelligence.” 
(Lowenthal, 2009, p. 257)  
4. Momentum to Continue to the Next Phase of the Intelligence Cycle 
The term “momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle” 
means the ability to tactically maneuver to the next phase while supplying actionable 
information, to continue the intelligence cycle in a timely and efficient manner.  
The presence or absence of each of these characteristics was assessed on a 
numerical scale between 1 and 5, with 1 being poorest quality and 5 being exceptional 
quality.  
1 = Poor  
2 = Mediocre  
3 = Good  
4 = High  
5 = Exceptional  
B. HOW EACH MODEL MANEUVERS THROUGH THE INTELLIGENCE 
CYCLE 
1. Planning and Direction Phase 









Resources 1 1 5 
Training/Expertise 1 1 5 
Information Sharing 1 1 5 






Resources. The TLO program is commonly viewed as a supplement to 
counterterrorism efforts and does not have resources involved in the planning and 
direction phase.  
Training and expertise. The intelligence cycle is used by a variety of 
public and government agencies, including the military, local police, private contractors, 
and federal agencies. The planning and direction managers, for the purpose of this thesis, 
are managers from local, state, and federal agencies that concentrate on homeland 
security efforts. Planning and direction managers are typically located in a fusion center 
or an interagency homeland security model like the JTTF. For example, at a fusion center 
the managers may include representatives of a city public-health department, a city fire 
department, a county law enforcement agency, a state transportation department, and a 
host of federal agency managers.  
The Planning and direction managers can strategically plan to utilize 
TLOs when planning a course of action to collect information. The DHS has a terrorism 
information gathering campaign slogan: “If you see something, say something.” The 
TLO program incorporates this idea and provides basic training to first responders to 
further understand terrorism warning signs and indicators, resulting in better quality and 
quantity of tips and leads. However, the DHS can not solely rely on the “if you see 
something, say something” campaign to collect homeland security intelligence. The 
campaign is merely meant to maximize the government’s resources by encouraging 
citizens to report suspicious behavior in the normal course of life. The TLO concept is a 
further step in the same direction: TLOs report suspicious behavior during their normal 
course of employment (Public Intelligence, 2010, p. 10). TLOs also receive training to 
better identify suspicious activity compared to the DHS campaign. Therefore, when 
managers strategize their homeland security efforts for collecting intelligence, they can 
use TLOs because they have been trained on tip and lead reporting and terrorism signs 




Information sharing. In the planning and direction phase, managers 
assess all avenues of information and intelligence collection. The TLO basic and 
advanced courses give TLO candidates a basic understanding of homeland security risks, 
common hints of terrorist activity, and instructions for submitting a tip or a lead to the 
fusion center or a counterterrorism unit (Public Intelligence, 2010, p. 10). 
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
planning and direction managers at fusion center levels who supervise the phases of the 
intelligence cycle do not include TLOs when they determine the intelligence 
requirements, formulation of specific intelligence collection, procession, analysis, and 
data dissemination. The TLOs are a resource to the planning and direction managers that 
they can utilize when forming strategy to collect information. Although the TLO model is 
generally not represented in the planning and direction phase, the mission and training of 
the TLOs ensure their progression to the collection phase.  
b. JIT 
Resources. The JIT program was a pilot program and not part of the local 
fusion center’s planning and direction phase.  
Training and expertise. One of the mandates of the JIT program requires 
JIT members to attend the basic TLO course. All JIT members must also complete a 
training course in which they watch five inmate interviews performed by seasoned JIT 
members and then perform five inmate interviews of their own, which are critiqued by a 
JIT supervisor. Once the JIT member finishes training, he must select a subject pertinent 
to intelligence gathering and study to become an expert in that subject. The subject may 
be a specific culture, terrorist group, country, language, drug cartel, or any homeland 
security–related subject. During the monthly JIT meetings, JIT members will educate the 
other members about that particular subject. Also, if an inmate has information about a 
subject which a JIT member has selected to study, then that JIT member will assist in the 




Information sharing. Since JIT members are required to attend the TLO 
basic course, each member of the team must comply with the TLO information sharing 
policy for submitting a tip and lead (Los Angeles County, 2010).  
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
JIT program is a pilot program, and the planning and direction managers may not be 
aware of its existence. However, the JIT model is like the TLO model in that it collects 
terrorism-related information and shares the information with the fusion center or 
counterterrorism detectives. Although the JIT model is not primarily part of the fusion 
center’s planning and direction phase, the JIT’s proactive mission ensures progression to 
the collection phase.  
c. JTTF  
The JTTF is a vital component in the planning and direction phase of the 
intelligence cycle. As Director Mueller stated, “Today, we are focused on prevention, not 
simply prosecution. We have shifted from detecting, deterring, and disrupting terrorist 
activities to detecting, penetrating, and dismantling terrorist enterprises—part of the 
FBI’s larger culture shift to a threat-driven intelligence and law enforcement agency” 
(Global Security, n.d.). The FBI has the primary responsibility for investigating terrorism 
matters in the United States, but as Director Mueller pointed out, the FBI has recognized 
that the best way to do this is in partnership with local, state, and other federal agencies. 
Director Mueller recognized that the FBI must incorporate local law enforcement as a 
key partner to detect, penetrate, and dismantle terrorist operations. The JTTFs take a 
multiagency approach to protect the national security interests of the United States, and 
they are a key component to the planning and direction phase strategy (Valiquette, 2010).  
Resources. Because the JTTF is a multiagency task force, there are a 
number of agencies that participate in its planning and direction phase. The JTTF 
attempts to broaden interagency collaboration by eliminating duplicated effort and 
combines local, state, and federal resources. The JTTF is funded by the FBI and 
Congress, which alleviates the local and state apprehension to participate and fosters an 




access to personnel and information pools and communication networks of every agency 
involved in that particular JTTF, for instance, and limited access to physical operational 
resources of every participant agency, from offices and labs to vehicles and gear.  
Training and expertise. Since each fusion center has a JTTF component 
and the JTTF’s managers are part of the planning and direction phase, they can make 
good use of their knowledge of the expertise of each JTTF and plan and direct the 
mission (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2004).  
Information sharing. The JTTF’s fundamental mandate is to share 
information (Lowenthal, 2009). The JTTFs are organized and empowered in every 
possible way to share information quickly, efficiently, and accurately, in order to help 
homeland security managersincluding fusion centers and local, state, and federal 
agencies, to better strategize for future missions.  
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
JTTF is a core component of the homeland security efforts, tasked by the planning and 
direction JTTF or fusion center managers to move to the next phase. They are given clear 
missions, goals, and resources to move to the next phase: Collection.  
2. Collection Phase 
Table 2.   Collection Phase of the Intelligence Cycle 





Resources 2 5 5 
Training/Expertise 2 4 5 
Information Sharing 1 4 5 
Momentum  1 4 5 
a. TLO 
Resources. TLOs may not have sophisticated surveillance gear or career-
quality training or broad peer networks of trained agents and analysts, but they do have 




whereas counterterrorism detectives or counterterrorism informants may not have the 
same opportunity (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.). There are only so many 
counterterrorism detectives, and they cannot be everywhere at once. The TLO program is 
therefore a significant enhancement to counterterrorism efforts, acting as another set of 
eyes and ears for intelligence collection.  
Training and expertise. To become a TLO one must complete the eight-
hour basic course and/or the 24-hour advanced course. These courses give TLOs an 
opportunity to meet counterterrorism detectives, tour the fusion center, and create 
relationships with a cadre of members from the intelligence community. During both 
courses, TLOs receive training to understand the needs of counterterrorism detectives in 
their area. Although TLOs at the minimum attend an eight- or 24-hour training course, 
they do not have the domestic or international experience or in-depth training to identify 
terrorism-related indicators. This is a required skill. “The TLO program is conceptually 
sound regarding the need to train local and state law enforcement officials in counter-
terrorism. However, its concepts lack recognition of the importance of knowledge 
dynamics and sustained knowledge flow.” (Burchnell, 2008, p. 36) Just because a person 
is of Arab descent, for example, does not make him or her an object of suspicion. Fusion 
centers receive such tips because untrained tipsters do not have the life experience, 
international knowledge, or skills to identify real terrorism-related information. 
Information sharing. The fusion center or counterterrorism detectives 
cannot depend on the TLOs as a regular source of information since the TLO position is a 
collateral duty. The TLO members are seldom tasked to gather information and only 
submit a tip or a lead if they see suspicious activity during their normal course of 
employment. Frequency of tip or lead submissions also depends heavily on whether or 
not the fusion center or counterterrorism detectives maintain a relationship with that 
TLO. Many times TLOs will go through the basic TLO course but afterward will have 
little interaction with the fusion center or counterterrorism detectives. Over time, the 
TLO’s motivation fades, and the number of tips and leads submitted to the fusion center 
decreases. The TLO model relies heavily on social interaction and the ability of the 




Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. 
Because the TLO position is a collateral duty, the collection of information depends 
entirely on the motivation of each specific TLO. The TLO position is a two-year 
agreement; at the end of this period, the TLO is replaced by another person who must 
complete the TLO training process. “If the person selected for the TLO position leaves 
after two years, the knowledge that he gained to do the job and by actually performing 
the job leaves with him. Knowledge flow, therefore, ceases and the process has to be 
started again from the beginning” (Burchnell, 2008, p. 36). For many agencies the TLO 
position, contributes little or nothing to the momentum to press on into the next phase of 
the intelligence cycle. Each unit, station, or department must decide whether it will be 
able to sustain a local TLO program, with the requisite initial recruitment and training 
and the ongoing nurturing of relationships. 
The TLO mission is limited to the collection, documentation, and 
reporting of homeland security information to the local fusion center. The next phase 
(processing and exploitation) takes place at or through the fusion center and never 
involves the TLO. 
b. JIT 
Resources. Since JIT members operate in a jail, they have many tools to 
collect information that are not available to detectives outside a jail. All phone 
conversation, visiting conversation, and letters to and from inmates (with the exception of 
letters between inmates and their attorneys and clergy) can be recorded or read without a 
search warrant, without personal acquaintance with the inmate, and without any probable 
cause. This is a valuable tool that the intelligence community can leverage since it needs 
a warrant, reasonable suspicion, and/or probable cause to gain access to this sort of 
surveillance or intelligence gathering outside the jail environment. JIT members can also 
gather information by conducting inmate searches, cell searches, or bugging a cell.  
JIT members gather homeland security information as a collateral duty. 
Their primary work assignment is to provide security to inmates in the housing area (Los 




those inmates spend 40 hours with each JIT member every week. Over the course of 
time, JIT members can assess, develop, and recruit inmates as homeland security 
informants.  
The intelligence community generally pays informants for information. In 
a jail setting there are a vast number of alternative ways to pay an inmate informant for 
information. Since their freedoms have been stripped from them, allowing the inmate to 
have extra phone, visiting, or recreational time has proved to be a more valuable 
incentive than money. This advantage saves the intelligence community money while it 
maximizes the collection of information in a controlled environment.  
Training and expertise. JIT members are TLO-trained and possess a 
basic understanding of the intelligence community, the local fusion center, and how to 
submit a tip or a lead. Beyond the TLO training course, each member of a JIT must 
complete an additional jail-specific training program, which includes participation in five 
inmate interviews with a seasoned JIT member, followed by responsibility for five 
inmate interviews with a senior JIT member observing the interview. Much of the JIT 
member’s expertise comes from on-the-job experience and regular debriefing/training 
meetings together as a team.  
Information sharing. Tips and leads are documented by a JIT member 
and submitted to a counterterrorism detective or other designated agent at the fusion 
center, simultaneously with submission to the JIT leader, as soon as that tip or lead has 
been collected and at least superficially vetted for accuracy. The time from information 
collection to initial reporting to the fusion center is no greater than eight hours, and it can 
often be less than four hours. In addition, the JIT has monthly meetings in which it shares 
information with one another, conducts training, or shares a request for information (RFI) 
received from a counterterrorism detective. JIT members discuss interviews conducted 
over the past month and share new indicators or trends that could be developing. If these 
discussions lead to salient insights concerning previously submitted intelligence or turn 
information that once seemed innocuous into a worthwhile tip or lead, the JIT team 
leader documents and submits those insights or leads to the fusion center as well, for 




Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
JIT mission is limited to the collection, documentation, and initial verification of 
homeland security information, which is reported to the local fusion center and 
counterterrorism detectives. The vast majority of the next phase (processing and 
exploitation) takes place at or through the fusion center and usually does not involve the 
JIT.  
c. JTTF 
Resources. The mission of a JTTF is to leverage the collective resources 
of its members to prevent, preempt, deter, and investigate domestic terrorist acts that 
affect the United States. Combining local, state, and federal personnel and resources 
helps spread the economic cost among all levels of government. Because each JTTF can 
incorporate a unique mix of government agencies and local organizations, and differing 
numbers and sizes of those agencies depending on the locale in which that JTTF operates, 
the resource mix and depth will differ for each JTTF. Urban JTTFs will generally be 
larger and better resourced than rural JTTFs, and a rural JTTF might have jurisdiction 
over a much larger geographic area, but a much smaller population. The nature of a JTTF 
is to bring together whatever law enforcement and first-responder resources do exist in a 
given area, organizing and empowering them to work together for maximum homeland 
security effectiveness. 
Training and expertise. A JTTF is generally made up of local 
investigators who have experience with informants, search warrants, and criminal 
operations. Since JTTFs work in a specified area, it is imperative that they include local 
law enforcement officers with street knowledge and community contacts as an integral 
part of the JTTF. Not only does a JTTF include experienced local investigators, but it 
also includes federal agents, who have a wealth of knowledge regarding domestic and 
international terrorism and who are connected to significant federal resources. 
Information sharing. The JTTF exists to facilitate information sharing 




background check to obtain a top secret or secret clearance, allowing the JTTF to openly 
communicate with local, state, and federal agents. 
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
JTTF employs investigators whose job it is to investigate homeland security–related 
crimes, so the collection of information and knowledge of protocol mandates the JTTF 
into the next phase.  
3. Processing and Exploitation Phase 









Resources 3 3 5 
Training/Expertise 1 2 5 
Information Sharing 1 2 5 
Momentum  1 2 5 
 
a. TLO 
Resources. The Los Angeles TLO program, like many around the nation, 
has a built-in processing and exploitation team in its fusion center, where TLOs report 
their tips and leads (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.).  
Training and expertise. During the process of becoming a TLO, an 
individual receives guidelines on reporting suspicious activity or homeland security–
related information. In Los Angeles the TLOs are directed to email a tip or lead to the 
LAJRIC Web site; the tip or lead is then automatically sent to the processing and 
exploitation team (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.). 
Information sharing. This is a one-way process, and the exploitation 
team does not communicate with the TLO. Communication is vital in this step because a 
translator may be required or information being decrypted may need context (possibly 
provided in part by the TLO) in order to accurately decrypt data (or to accurately 




Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. 
During phase three, the processing and exploitation phase, the momentum of the TLO 
model generally fades away. During meetings with TLOs their biggest complaint is that 
they do not receive feedback regarding a tip or lead that they have submitted to the fusion 
center. This is understandably disappointing to them, but it is a necessary part of 
operational security. After the collection phase, TLOs are seldom part of any additional 
phase.  
b. JIT 
In this phase, the JIT model nearly mirrors the TLO model since each 
model’s mission is to submit the information collected to the fusion center for processing 
and analysis.  
Resources. JIT members are TLO-trained and submit their tips and leads 
to the fusion center (Los Angeles County, 2010). The fusion center has personnel who 
process and exploit the tips or leads.  
Training and expertise. During TLO training, JIT members receive 
guidelines for reporting suspicious activity or homeland security–related information. In 
Los Angeles the JIT members are directed to email a tip or lead to the LAJRIC Web site, 
from which it is automatically sent to the processing and exploitation team (Joint 
Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.). 
Information sharing. This is a one-way process, and the processing and 
exploitation team does not continue to update the JIT on the progress of the investigation. 
However, communication is vital in this step because translation may be required, or 
information being decrypted may need context (possibly provided by the JIT) to 
accurately decrypt and analyze data (or to accurately understand a lead in a foreign 
language). 
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. 
During phase three, the processing and exploitation phase, the momentum of the JIT 




processing and exploitation may contact the JIT members for further information, which 
allows the member of JIT to feel part of the investigative process and to build a 
relationship with members from the fusion center. This contact encourages the JIT 
momentum to continue.  
c. JTTF 
Resources. The FBI’s processing and exploitation resources are vast. The 
FBI has language skills and exploitation skills that cover an enormous range of 
experience. Since the JTTFs are comprised of some FBI agents, the JTTFs are able to 
utilize the processing and exploitation resources of the FBI and the local fusion centers as 
well. 
Training and expertise. The JTTF members generally are connected to a 
fusion center or an FBI analyst, where they have access to experienced people to process 
and exploit the information.  
Information sharing. As mentioned above, the JTTF members interact 
directly with personnel who process the information; therefore, they can share 
information face to face, which permits an open and dynamic flow of information 
sharing.  
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. 
JTTF members collect intelligence as part of their mission. Once they gather the 
information, they wait for the processing to be completed so that they can further their 
investigation and the momentum is continued to the analytical phase.  
4. Analysis and Production 









Resources 2 2 5 
Training/Expertise 1 2 5 
Information Sharing 1 1 5 





Resources. The TLOs are not involved in this step and have no resources 
allocated for this. 
Training and expertise. The TLOs are not trained in analysis and 
production and develop no expertise in this role. The fusion centers or counterterrorism 
units, to whom the TLOs report, will have analysts assigned to them who can expertly 
examine the information.  
Information sharing. Analysts generally do not communicate with the 
TLO who submitted the lead. Therefore the analyst could miss important context 
concerning the lead. Time-sensitive actionable information can be collected by the TLO, 
but if the TLO does not have a good personal relationship with a counterterrorism 
detective, the intelligence may become stale due to the time it takes to process the 
information. Also, most fusion centers operate on the weekends at minimum staffing, if 
they operate at all. During weekends and holidays, time-sensitive actionable intelligence 
will take longer to process and disseminate to the end users. There are no weekend breaks 
for terrorist activities; therefore, it is important to leverage all actionable information in a 
timely manner because failing to do so could be devastating.  
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
TLO generally is not contacted, and the momentum for the TLO to continue collecting 
information diminishes because of the lack of feedback. However, the local fusion center 
will ensure that the information continues around the intelligence cycle.  
b. JIT 
In phase four, the analytical phase, the JIT model’s performance mirrors 
the TLO model since the process is the same. The JIT model is not involved with the 
analysis and production phase of the intelligence cycle. On rare occasions, analysts may 




Resources. The JIT model does not have an analysis component that is 
directly integrated within the JIT model. However the JIT model does use the local fusion 
center for analysis and production.  
Training and Expertise. The JIT members have a specific expertise that 
the analysts at the local fusion center do not possess: knowledge of the intricacies of the 
jail system. This knowledge includes jail databases, jail terminology, and jail culture. 
During the analysis phase jail expertise could be useful in order to understand the context 
of the information collected and processed into intelligence.  
Information Sharing. Since the JIT model does not have members at the 
local fusion center, the information is not shared. The fusion center collects information 
from the JIT members, but rarely are JIT members contacted about the information they 
send to the fusion center. Also, JIT members do not have secret clearances; therefore, if 
the information is later classified as “secret,” the JIT members are not allowed access to 
the information. 
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. This 
phase of the intelligence cycle alienates the JIT members because members are no longer 
involved in the intelligence cycle. Alienation can reduce the number of tips and leads that 
the fusion center receives from the JIT members.  
c. JTTF 
Resources. The JTTFs have a wide range of resources, including an 
analyst from the FBI and local law enforcement agencies with an expertise in cartels, 
immigration fraud, counterfeit currency, international terrorist organizations, domestic 
terrorist organizations, and cyber terrorism.  
Training and Expertise. Analysts with wide proficiency are valuable 
when analyzing a wide range of homeland security information, such as is found in the 
jail system. In addition, since JTTF members interact with the analyst, a JTTF member 




Information Sharing. Federal analysts have top-secret clearances and can 
use secret federal databases when analyzing information. Checking information through 
federal databases allows the intelligence community to connect with all 50 states, a great 
help when striving to “connect the dots.” 
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. 
JTTF members are still actively involved in the case at this point and will press forward 
to phase five for new direction regarding the analyzed information.  
5. Dissemination and Integration Phase 









Resources 1 1 5 
Training/Expertise 1 1 5 
Information Sharing 1 1 5 
Momentum 1 1 5 
 
a. TLO and JIT  
The fusion centers are responsible for disseminating the intelligence 
products to the end user or consumer for integration. The TLOs and JIT members are not 
part of this phase.  
From an operational standpoint this makes perfect sense, but from a 
leadership perspective that takes a longer view, it is a problem that needs to be addressed. 
After a tip or a lead is emailed to the fusion center, the submitter seldom receives any 
follow-up. He will usually receive an email, thanking him for the information, but rarely 
does he receive feedback regarding the value of the information. TLO and JIT exclusion 
is largely based on the lack of security clearance: if the TLO or JIT member submits 





hinders the TLO and JIT program. When a TLO or JIT member spends time to submit 
information, he would like feedback; without feedback he is less motivated to continue 
the intelligence cycle.  
b. JTTF 
Resources. The information is disseminated to appropriate investigators, 
policy makers, and managers.  
Training and expertise. Each phase of the intelligence cycle possesses 
personnel with a mission and a set of expertise. The dissemination and integration phase 
allows the JTTF to examine the intelligence and to use its training and experience to act 
on the intelligence gathered.  
Information sharing. Since the JTTF is a task force with local, state, and 
federal agents with secret clearances, the information is shared at all levels of 
government. The Counter-Terrorism Executive Board (CTEB) was created as a way for 
executives whose agency is part of a JTTF to exchange information and update the 
progress of terrorism-related cases. The CTEB is comprised of the top-ranking leadership 
with members in the JTTF; it allows the exchange of ideas and promotes agency 
participation in the JTTF. The CTEB is a prime example of how the JTTF model 
disseminates information to all agencies involved in the JTTF, and it provides a great 
impetus to continue the intelligence cycle. 
Momentum to continue to the next phase of the intelligence cycle. The 
JTTF model integrates the information by planning and thus starts the intelligence cycle 
all over again.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This research seeks to extrapolate the best practices of each model to form a 
robust, transferable model for collecting homeland security information from the jail 
system. An evaluation of the three models generated both expected and unexpected 





surprisingly, the JTTF model scored highest with a perfect score. This was mainly due to 
the fact that the JTTF is a full-time position, has local, state, and federal resources, and 
has an integral information sharing platform.  

















Exploitation 6 9 20 
Analysis and 
Production 5 6 20 
Dissemination and 
Integration 4 4 20 
 
An unforeseen result appeared in the collection phase of the intelligence cycle. 
The JIT model performed nearly as well as the JTTF model, even though the JIT model is 
a collateral duty and functions in the collection phase without state and federal resources. 
However, it is important to remember that the JTTF model was evaluated according to its 
performance in its original environment, which is outside the jail system. The JTTF 
model does not normally collect any homeland security information from the jail system 
at all. 
A review of the three models shows several characteristics common to the TLO 
and JIT models and several characteristics demonstrating that the JTTF model surpassed 
the TLO and JIT models. The following offers a comparison and explanation for these 
characteristics in each phase of the intelligence cycle. 
In the planning and direction phase, the JTTF was a far superior model than the 
TLO and JIT since the JTTF is a federally funded model. The JTTFs are assigned 





JIT models are merely requested to report suspicious activity that they observe. The JTTF 
staff contributes to the strategy in the planning and direction phase at the local, regional, 
and sometimes at the national level. 
The collection phase generated an unexpected result. The JIT was a collateral-
duty team and a pilot project without formal funding, but the JIT model scored nearly as 
highly as the JTTF model, which has full-time staff and is funded by local, state, and 
federal agencies. The JIT model possessed the ability to utilize its position in the jail, as 
well as existing jail-specific technology and knowledge of jail policy and procedures, to 
successfully collect homeland security information. Since the JTTF staff roles are full-
time positions, the members do not have the advantage of working in an inmate housing 
area, an advantage that allows JIT members to spot, assess, and recruit informants. JIT 
members also have access to inmate visitor logs, recorded inmate phone calls, and inmate 
cell listening devices to gather information. In a jail setting one does not need a search 
warrant to search inmate cells or to view incoming or outgoing inmate mail. A JTTF 
member could also utilize the above tools if the need arose, but without working in a jail 
facility, a JTTF member will not be able to determine which inmates to approach to 
collect information. A JTTF investigator might make good use of jail technology and 
protocol to build a case about certain individuals based on outside tips or leads, but no 
JTTF member can be in the position to pick up fresh tips and leads as they come to light 
in the jail setting itself. 
Each model possessed an avenue to process and exploit the information collected. 
The JTTF scored higher due to the fact that the JTTF members generally know the 
members of the processing and exploitation phase and have direct contact with the 
personnel who process the information collected. In contrast, the TLO and JIT members 
submit a tip or a lead via the Internet without any contact with a member from the 
processing and exploitation phase. This is the phase where the TLO and JIT member’s 
momentum begins to decrease around the intelligence cycle.  
The analysis and production phase yielded nearly the same results as the 
processing and exploitation phase for the same reasons. The TLO and JIT members are 




generally is notified of the analyst working on the information he collects. In addition, if 
the analysis contains classified information, TLO and JIT members often will not be able 
to view the analysis because they do not have appropriate security clearances.  
The final phase, the dissemination and integration phase, is the phase where the 
findings are most disturbing. The TLO and JIT models scored the lowest on this phase 
because members rarely receive feedback about the information they submit. The failure 
to provide feedback results in a reduction in momentum to continue the intelligence 
cycle. This is tragic. 
During my involvement with the TLO and JIT programs, I witnessed members 
motivated at the onset of their collateral duty assignments, but when they failed to receive 
feedback, they in turn failed to note or report additional homeland security information. 
During my research I discovered that the primary complaint from members of TLO and 
JIT programs was that they did not receive feedback about the information they 
submitted. As a result, TLOs and JIT members mistakenly assumed that their tips and 
leads were either ignored or proved fruitless; they were therefore less and less motivated 
to take the time to submit a tip or a lead, which in turn diminishes homeland security 
collection efforts. 
During the review of the analysis, it became evident that the JIT model possesses 
a unique ability to collect information in a jail environment. The JIT scored 17 of 20 in 
the collection phase, despite the fact that the JIT members do not have the opportunity to 
devote 40 hours a week to collect homeland security intelligence. The JTTF model scored 
20 of 20 in the collection phase, but if the JTTF model were evaluated by its probability 
to collect information in a jail setting, the JTTF model’s collection phase rating would 
plummet. The JTTF, being a local, state, and federal task force, lacks an intimate 
knowledge of jail procedures, an opportunity to develop a strong rapport with inmates, 
and a mastery of the technical capability of a jail setting to collect information—all 





The TLO program utilizes homeland security training classes to better educate 
first responders to recognize homeland security indicators and to teach them the protocol 
for submitting a tip or lead to the fusion center. Even though the JIT utilizes the TLO 
training programs and networking capabilities, the JIT scored higher than the TLO model 
because of the number of persons assigned to each JIT verses the typical TLO 
deployment model, where generally there is just one TLO assigned to an entire unit or 
department. The JIT is also a more active model, with monthly meetings to share 
information, a sense of team identity and camaraderie, and a proactive mission to collect 
homeland security information. In contrast, the TLO program is both solitary and 
reactive: TLOs operate as the sole trained sentry watching for possible terrorist activity, 
and they are taught not to actively investigate or seek out terrorist threats but to report 
suspicious homeland security information when they stumble across it serendipitously in 
the line of duty (Joint Regional Intelligence Center, n.d.).  
The JTTF model scored the highest due to the JTTF mission mandate, broad 
resource pool, and full-time highly trained well-connected agents focused exclusively on 
homeland security efforts. JTTF members have direct contact with specialists in each 
phase of the intelligence cycle, which in turn helps to create momentum around the 
intelligence cycle. JTTF members are generally experienced investigators with 
knowledge of homeland security issues. JTTF members also have security clearances, 
which helps the information sharing process. Finally, the JTTF has resources from the 
local, state, and federal levels, which enhances its ability to effectively maneuver around 
the intelligence cycle.  
In summary, although the TLO model could happen to include an occasional jail 
deputy, the model itself is not well suited to systematically and proactively collect 
homeland security information from the jail system. The JIT model is the closest extant 
example of effective intelligence gathering within a jail inmate population: it allows a 
natural rapport with jail inmates, provides the ability to assess inmates, and utilizes 
existing human and technology resources efficiently. However, the current JIT model 
requires several improvements in order to serve as a “best-practice” model for mining the 




The JIT model is not part of the last three phases of the intelligence cycle, which slows 
the JIT momentum to continue the cycle. Also, JIT members are not investigators, nor do 
they have an in-depth knowledge of current homeland security matters. The JTTF model 
itself, replicated and focused on collecting intelligence from the jail system, is also not 
well-suited for that task: this would represent bureaucratic and budgetary overkill and 
unnecessarily duplicate the depth and complexity of any existing JTTF in its jurisdiction. 
However, a combination of these models (JIT and JTTF) would prove to be a “best-


















VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. DISCUSSION 
This thesis does not attempt to develop a new intelligence apparatus for the jail 
system because this would require significant new assets and personnel in a fiscally 
constrained environment. The FBI has over 28,000 employees, 56 field offices, and 400 
satellite offices (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 424). There are 104 Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces (JTTFs) across the nation and 4,400 JTTF members from over 600 state and local 
agencies and 50 federal agencies (FBI, 2004). A thriving framework already exists in the 
JTTF model—however, that framework must be adjusted and supplemented in order for 
it to properly serve the jail system.  
America is stronger and more resilient as a result of the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission to share information and to integrate all sources of information in order 
to “connect the dots” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 407). However, the intelligence 
community must evaluate the last 10 years and determine whether any strategic gaps still 
remain in intelligence collection. This thesis clearly documents that some of the most 
notorious terrorists have spent time in a jail and that the intelligence community has yet 
to take advantage of this insight. The very idea of “homeland security” is a new concept 
developed on the heels of 9/11 to address the domestic threats that the United States 
faces. One rapidly increasing threat is the Mexican drug cartels. “Not only are the 
Mexican cartel wars violent, they are increasingly brutal. New weaponry are joining 
grenade attacks, beheadings, cartel information operations, ‘corpse-messaging’—or 
leaving a message on a mutilated corpse—to shape the operational space” (Sullivan, 
2012, p. 8). Drug cartel violence is spilling over into the United States, and the United 
States must address the threat. The U.S. jail system is a prime environment to collect 
information about the cartels (Borunda, 2011). 
Excessive violence by the cartels is a national security problem for 
Mexico, and—as our close neighbor and political ally—presents high 
stakes for the United States. In the past year, U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies have worked diligently to reach a consensus view 




violent tactics. These discussions required the interagency to define 
“spillover” in practical terms. As agreed to by the interagency community, 
spillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. 
assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent 
U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, 
consulates, or businesses. (FBI, 2010) 
The U.S. jail system is flooded with inmates who have transported drugs for the 
drug cartels or have actionable information relevant to the drug cartels (Borunda, 2011). 
Many persons involved in this emerging threat to the United States—and much of the 
information that can help address it—is confined within the U.S. jail system (Borunda, 
2011). Notorious terrorists and drug cartels are just two documented examples that prove 
that the U.S. jail system possesses actionable homeland security information.  
The federal government acknowledges that local law enforcement officers are on 
the front lines of detection and prevention (USDHS, 2012). Members of the intelligence 
community are rarely surrounded by such a rich concentration of actionable homeland 
security information as are the law enforcement officers who work inside a U.S. jail 
facility. These officers are on the front lines of detection and prevention, but they must 
obtain the support, resources, and expertise of the intelligence community as a whole. In 
order to better protect the United States, the intelligence community must embrace a 
homeland security jail information concept and ensure that jail information collection 
efforts rotate around the intelligence cycle without losing momentum. A combination of 
the JTTF and the Jail Interview Team (JIT) models would be the best model for a 
homeland security jail information team.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Contemporary terrorism is a complex phenomenon involving a range of 
non-state actors linked in networked organizations. These organizations, 
exemplified by the global jihad movement known as al-Qaeda, are 
complex non-state actors operating as transnational networks within a 
galaxy of like-minded networks. These entities pose security threats to 
nation states and the collective global security. Traditional security and 
intelligence approaches separated criminal and national security 
intelligence, as well as domestic and international security concerns. 
Modern terrorism exploits these seams to operate on a global scale. 




Terrorists have successfully exploited the U.S. intelligence weaknesses described 
above. The intelligence community must now exploit the advantage that the U.S. jail 
system offers and create a homeland security jail information team. Currently there are 
two successful frameworks in place to proactively collect homeland security information: 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the Jail Intelligence Team (JIT). The JTTF 
concept can be utilized and its efforts expanded to include the jail system, creating a 
bridge between the JIT members and the intelligence community. This eliminates the 
major cost for resources and personnel that would be required to create a completely new 
model. The JTTF/JIT concept also does not place the personnel and financial burden on 
one agency alone. A homeland security jail intelligence program would benefit local, 
state, and federal agencies, and security is the responsibility of law enforcement at all 
levels of government (Mueller, 2011). Therefore, local, state, and federal agencies should 
share their resources and personnel to establish a homeland security jail intelligence 
program.  
The 9/11 Commission agrees. According to the commission report:  
The FBI is just a small fraction of the national law enforcement 
community in the United States, a community comprised mainly of state 
and local agencies. The network designed for sharing information, and the 
work of the FBI through local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, should build a 
reciprocal relationship, in which state and local agents understand what 
information they are looking for and, in return, receive some of the 
information being developed about what is happening, or may happen, in 
their communities. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 444)  
A JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence model would promote interagency 
collaboration, create interagency relationships, and advance information sharing efforts 
among the entire law enforcement community.  
In light of the research analysis, a JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence 
model is strongly recommended. The JIT has resources that the JTTF does not have, 
particularly the ability to utilize signals intelligence (SIGINT) without the need of a 
warrant. Newly arrested inmates will communicate with individuals outside a jail facility 
using telephones, computers, and online inmate-visiting sessions. These forms of 




positioned to observe suspects, interview, develop relationships, and recruit informants 
(HUMINT), in a way that is almost unknown outside the jail environment. The JTTF 
model also has resources that the JIT model does not possess, including classified 
information, direction received from the planning and direction managers, in-depth 
homeland security knowledge and training, intelligence databases, and intelligence 
community networks. The implementation of a JTTF/JIT concept would maximize a 
homeland security jail intelligence team concept and better fulfill the needs of each phase 
of the intelligence cycle.  
When developing a JTTF/JIT homeland security jail intelligence model, the size 
and exact composition of the model will depend on location, number of inmates in a 
specific jail, crimes in that particular jurisdiction, and the profile of the inmates. Thus, the 
composition of the jail intelligence model will vary. In a city comparable to Los Angeles, 
the JTTF model should consist of jail personnel who work directly with inmates, like a 
JIT: local and state homeland security detectives, personnel from the local fusion center, 
FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Secret Service. Inmates 
incarcerated in the U.S. jail system hold information about drug cartels, human 
trafficking/illegal immigration, firearms and explosives, counterfeit merchandise used to 
fund terrorist groups, and counterfeit U.S. currency. The federal agencies have much to 
gain from information collected in a jail system. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Exploring uncharted territories is always fraught with challenges and obstacles. 
However, the creation of a homeland security jail information program is worth the effort 
and dedication it will take to overcome and excel. The following recommendations 
should be explored when creating a homeland security jail information program: 
• Determine which local, state, and federal agencies will participate in the 
program;  
 
• From the agencies who desire to participate, create an exploratory 




• The exploratory committee must determine the needs, level of 
involvement, and expectations of each agency; 
 
• The exploratory committee can draft a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), agreed by and signed by each agency to form a homeland security 
jail intelligence model; 
 
• Managers at jail facilities should be part of the exploratory committee and 
should educate the other members about the laws and policies governing a 
jail facility; 
 
• The exploratory committee should attempt to garner support and input 
from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); 
 
• The exploratory committee must develop a protocol to progress around the 
intelligence cycle; and 
 
• The exploratory committee must establish training and goals and means 
for all members of the jail interview team, beginning with training and 
orientation to the new model. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
September 11, 2011, was a day that changed the United States, especially with 
regard to law enforcement’s role in national security (Velez-Villar, 2012). The FBI’s 
assistant director, Directorate of Intelligence, Eric Velez-Villar, stated to the House 
Homeland Security Committee, “Given the diverse threats we face, it is essential that law 
enforcement entities work together, making our partnerships with all levels of law 
enforcement that much more invaluable” (Velez-Villar, 2012). The 9/11 Commission was 
formed to investigate “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 12). During its investigation, the 9/11 
Commission discovered several failures concerning local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies. The following were failures determined by the 9/11 Commission 
(9/11 Commission, 2004): 
The government’s ability to collect intelligence inside the United States, 
and the sharing of such information between the intelligence and law 
enforcement communities, was not a priority before 9/11. (p. 345) 
Before 9/11, with the exception of one portion of the FBI, very little of the 




terrorism. Moreover, law enforcement could be effective only after 
specific individuals were identified, a plot had formed, or an attack had 
already occurred.” (p. 444) 
The following are recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission to address the 
failures that led up to the terrorist attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004):  
Long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: 
diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, 
foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool 
while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our 
national effort. (p. 381) 
[Unify] the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their 
knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends 
traditional governmental boundaries. (p. 398) 
The US government, joined by other governments around the world, is 
working through intelligence, law enforcement, military, financial, and 
diplomatic channels to identify, disrupt, capture, or kill individual 
terrorists. (p. 398) 
There is a growing role for state and local law enforcement agencies. They 
need more training and work with federal agencies so that they can 
cooperate more effectively with those federal authorities in identifying 
terrorist suspects. (p. 403) 
September 11, 2001, marked a seismic shift in the American paradigm of national 
security (Lowenthal, 2009, p. 25). In a letter written by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on September 17, 2001, Wolfowitz wrote,  
[I] wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of 
suicide pilots, seeing a “failure of imagination” and a mindset that 
dismissed possibilities. (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 336)  
Much has changed since then. The major structural and paradigmatic adjustments 
in response to the reality check of 9/11 have laid a robust foundation for America’s 
homeland security in the twenty-first century, but the extent and success of those changes 
can foster the same comfortable lack of imagination that made us so vulnerable before 
9/11 (Johnson & Wirtz, 2011, p. 35). We must not fail to imagine the intelligence 
collection possibilities in our jail system. We must not become complacent but must press 
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